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THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF STANDING:
PRIVILEGE, SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION, AND THE PREDICTABLE
INCOHERENCE OF ARTICLE III

ChristianB. Sundquist
This Article examines the indeterminag of standing
doctrine by deconstructing recent desegregation, affirmative
action, and racialprofiling cases. This examination is an
attempt to uncover the often unstated meta-princijles that
guide standingjurisprudence. The Article contends that the
inherent indeterminag of standing law can be understood as
reflecting an unstated desire to protect radal and class
privilege, which is accomplished through the dogma of
individualism, equal opportunity (liberty), and "white
innocence." Reying on insights from System Justfication
Theory, a burgeoning field of socialpsychology, the Article
argues that the seeming/ incoherent results in racialstanding
cases can be understood as unconscious attempts to preserve
the status quo. The Article proposes moving "beyond the
transcendental nonsense" of standing doctrine and its
inevitable replication of economic and racial privilege by
completely eliminating all standing limitations to the access of
justice.
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION
...............................................
120
STANDING DOCTRINE AND ARTICLE III........
.......... 123
A. Contemporary Justifications for the Doctrine of
Standing.............................................................................128
1. Separation-of-Powers Theories ........................ 129
2. Representational Theories
............. ........ 131

*Associate Professor of Law, Albany Law School. J.D., Georgetown
University Law Center. I thank Mary Lynch, Peter Halewood, Donna Young,
Alicia Ouellette, Nancy Ota, Stephen Clark, Maria Grahn-Farley, Keith
Hirokawa, Ray Brescia, and Lenese Herbert for their support and advice
during the preparation of this Article. I am especially grateful to James Gathii
and Anthony Farley for their invaluable comments on previous drafts of this
Article. I also express appreciation to my assistant Theresa Colbert and my
research assistants Christopher Stevens and Allyson Stein for their amazing
support.

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW

2011

120

III. THE INDETERMINACY OF STANDING DOCTRINE....................134
A. Of Black Injuries, Desegregation, and Profiling............ 135
..... 141
B. Of White Injuries, Innocence, and Merit ......
IV. THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF MODERN STANDING
DOCTRINE............................................146

A.

Social Justification Theory, Privilege, and Threats
to the Status Quo
............................... 146
From the Descriptive to the Normative: SJT, Critical
Theory, and the Law of Standing.
................. 149
The First Principles of Standing Law......
......... 154

B.
C.
V.
VI.

I.

BEYOND THE "TRANSCENDENTAL NONSENSE" OF
STANDING
..........................................
156
CONCLUSION
...................................
..... 160

INTRODUCTION

The murky waters of standing doctrine have been criticized
for their indeterminacy,
political undercurrents, 2 and even
3
"apparent lawlessness."
The law of standing ostensibly seeks to
ensure that the federal courts entertain only justiciable "cases" and
"controversies." 4 The contemporary interpretation of the "cases"
and "controversies" language of Article III of the United States
Constitution borrows heavily from traditional tort concepts of
damage and causation. Accordingly-under the modern standing
framework-plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have suffered an
injury to a cognizable legal interest and that said injury was caused
by the actions of the opposing party.5 Plaintiffs also must request
from the court relief that is capable of redressing the claimed injury.6

1 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 243 (1984); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law,
73 CALIF. L. REv. 1151 (1985); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of
ContractDoctrine, 94 YALE L. J. 997 (1985); Joseph William Singer, The Player and
the Cards:Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984).
2 Richard J. Pierce, Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741
(1999).
3 William Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223
(1988).
4 U.S. Const. art. III.
5 See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
6

Id. at 475.
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The seemingly clear and orderly tripartite framework of
Article III standing doctrine nonetheless has spawned widespread
and consistent uncertainty.7 Theoretical justifications for standing
doctrine are largely inadequate to reconcile conflicting judicial
interpretations of Article III. These theories often rely on an
incoherent adherence to a private rights framework for adjudication.
The current content of standing law simply cannot be rationalized
by reference to classic representational or separation-of-powers
theories.
What, then, guides the content and meaning of modern
standing law?
How can one reconcile disparate judicial
interpretations of the meaning of Article III standing doctrine when
structural and constitutional arguments fail? This Article argues that
the inherent indeterminacy of standing law can be understood as
reflecting an unstated desire to protect racial and class privilege,
which is accomplished through the dogma of individualism, equal
opportunity (liberty), and "white innocence." Relying on insights
from System Justification Theory (SJT), a well-respected field of
social psychology, this Article argues that the seemingly incoherent
results in racial standing cases can be understood as (perhaps)
unconscious attempts to preserve the status quo. The Article
proposes moving "beyond the transcendental nonsense" 8 of
standing doctrine, and its inevitable replication of economic and
racial privilege, by completely eliminating all standing limitations to
the access of justice.
Part II of this Article will recount the historical genesis of
standing doctrine while examining the Court's contemporary
interpretation of the standing requirements of Article III. For nearly
a quarter of a century following the creation of Article III, the
"cases" and "controversies" language of Article III was not
interpreted by the courts as imposing any restrictions on
justiciability. Rather, federal review of cases was governed solely by
the existence of a substantive cause of action.

7 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(describing standing doctrine as "one of the most amorphous [concepts] in the
entire domain of public law") (citation omitted); Heather Elliot, The Functions of
Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 466 (2008) ("Such unpredictability has
generated extensive controversy. Critics have argued that the doctrine is
'incoherent,' is 'manipulable' and permeated with 'doctrinal confusion' ..... "
(citations omitted).
8 Felix Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35
COLUM. L. REv. 809, 812 (1935).
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This section also will review and critique the prominent
theoretical and constitutional defenses of Article III standing
doctrine. The modern interpretation of the "cases" and
"controversies" language of Article III as requiring a showing of
injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability is defended largely on
separation-of-powers and representational grounds. Part II asserts
that the current standing framework does not protect "stakeholder"
plaintiffs, 9 despite widely-held beliefs that representational theories
ensure that the judicial process is sufficiently representative of the
body politic.10
Part III of this Article will examine the indeterminate nature
of modern standing doctrine. In particular, this section will examine
the Court's recent standing jurisprudence in the desegregation,
affirmative action, racial discrimination, and racial profiling contexts
in order to illustrate the unworkable application of contemporary
standing requirements.
Part IV of this Article addresses the seemingly irreconcilable
conflict between the Court's broad interpretation of Article III
"injury" in cases that are hostile to desegregation and affirmative
action efforts with the overly restrictive conception of "injury"
applied in cases that seek to promote racial integration or redress
racial discrimination. The section relies heavily on insights from SJT
to explain how the indeterminacy of standing doctrine can be
explained only by an unstated desire to protect racial and class
privilege. SJT demonstrates that the Court is cognitively motivated
to respond to perceived threats to the status quo by rationalizing the
existence of social and racial inequality.
The final section of this Article advocates moving "beyond
the transcendental nonsense"" of standing and its inevitable
replication of economic and racial privilege. The Court must
eliminate all vestiges of the current standing framework in order to
remove what has proven to be one of the principal barriers to social
justice.

9 This term, in a standing context, is used to refer to those who stand
to gain something or suffer an injury-in-fact as the result of a lawsuit-those
who have a direct stake in the litigation's outcome.
10Lea Brilmayer, The JuriprudenceofArticle III: Perpectives on the "Case
or Controvery" Requirement, 93 HARV. L. REV. 297 (1979).
n Cohen, supranote 8, at 812.
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STANDING DOCTRINE AND ARTICLE III

The ubiquitous "cases" and "controversies" language of
Article III has long been relied upon by the Court to legitimize the
narrowing of federal court jurisdiction. 12 The Court has argued that
those terms impose strict constitutional limits on federal judicial
review and that federal courts lack jurisdiction over cases where the
plaintiff lacks a "sufficient stake" in the outcome. 13 However, the
current interpretation of Article III as imposing "standing"
requirements is neither a natural nor inevitable jurisprudential
evolution. Indeed, at the time of this Nation's founding, the law did
not recognize limitations on federal judicial review based on notions
of "standing." 14 Rather, the ability of plaintiffs to access justice
through the federal courts was tied to their ability to articulate a legal
right and frame a viable substantive cause of action. 15 Thus,
plaintiffs who sufficiently alleged a primafadie case could have their
rights protected by the courts of the United States.
It is unsurprising that the courts did not feel constitutionally
compelled to craft a standing doctrine during this time. After all,
the text of Article III itself does not refer to "standing," "injury," or
"causation," 1 6 and it certainly does not require that federal plaintiffs
have a "personal stake" 17 in the outcome of the litigation. Article
III, on its face, merely extends the "judicial [p]ower" to a number of
specific categories of "cases" and "controversies." 18 Tellingly, the

12See U.S. CONsT. art. III.
13 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 US. 727, 731-32 (1972).
14 See e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of GtirZen
Suits, 'Injuries," andArticle III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 170 (1992) (noting that,
during the period from the nation's founding until roughly 1920, "there was no
separate standing doctrine at all") (internal citations omitted).
1s Id. at 170. In arguing that Article III does not prevent so-called
citizen suits on standing grounds, Professor Sunstein states: "No one believed
that the Constitution limited Congress' power to confer a cause of action.
Instead, what we now consider to be the question of standing was answered by
deciding whether Congress or any other source of law had granted the plaintiff
a right to sue. To have standing, a litigant needed a legal right to bring suit ...
. If neither Congress not the common law had conferred a right to sue, no
case or controversy existed." Id.
16See U.S. CONsT. art. III.
17 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 260-61 (2003) (requiring plaintiff
to have personal stake in outcome of litigation in order to satisfy standing
requirement).

18 U.S. Const. art. III
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Court's first reference to "standing" as an Article III limitation did
not occur until 1944.19
The first whisperings of a standing limitation emergedsomewhat ironically-during the progressive jurisprudence of the
New Deal Court. The New Deal Court, led by Justices Brandeis
and Frankfurter, sought to "insulate progressive and New Deal
legislation from frequent judicial attack" in their steadfast belief that
courts should not intervene in democratic processes. 20 During this
period, the Court eventually interpreted Article III as incorporating
a "legal interest" requirement for plaintiff standing. 21 The "legal
interest" requirement thus constitutionalized the prior practice of
requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a connection to a common law
right and served to protect the Supreme Court's developing
progressive doctrine from challenge by more conservative courts.
The passage of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")
in 1946 was an important moment in the development of the law of
standing.22 The APA provides that "[a] person suffering legal wrong
because of an agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof." 23
The expansion of federal court
jurisdiction over agency actions did not supplant the legal interest
requirement of yore. Rather, the passage of the APA was in part an
attempt to "codify the developing body of judge-made standing law
. . . to recognize standing in three straightforward categories of
cases." 24
Those three categories included situations where a
plaintiffs common law or statutory legal interest was implicated.
Thus, the passage of the APA did not alter the existing rightsoriented standing analysis.
The Burger and Rehnquist courts, however, sought to
develop a more restrictive view of standing under Article III over
the next few decades by narrowly interpreting plaintiff injuries that
conflicted with their burgeoning conservative ideological agendas. 25

19 Sunstein, supra note 14, at 170 (citing Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S.
288, 307-09 (1944)).
20 Id. at 179. See also Stephen L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and
the Pblem ofSelf-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1418-25 (1988).
21 See supranote 5 and accompanying text.
22 See Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237
(1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-06 (2006)).
23 5 U.S.C. § 702.
24 Sunstein, supra note 14, at 181.
25 For examples of the Burger Court denying standing to disfavored
federal claims, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), Ciy of Los Angeles v.
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Accordingly, the Court ultimately incorporated common law tort
concepts of injury, causation, and redressability into its Article III
standing calculus. The Court's landmark decision in Association of
Data Processing Organiation v. Camp completely displaced the former
focus on substantive legal rights, holding that federal court review
was limited to only those plaintiffs who could demonstrate an
"injury in fact, economic or otherwise." 26 The Court declared that
the legal interest test was relevant only to "the merits" of a case, and
that the "question of standing [was] different. It concerns, apart
from the 'case' or 'controversy' test, the question whether the
interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question." 27 While this case interpreted
standing under the APA, future decisions have clarified that a
showing of injury-in-fact is a constitutional standing requirement of
Article 111.28
The current framework for standing thus incorporates the
injury-in-fact requirement, while adding causation and redressability
to the calculus. Accordingly, today, a plaintiff is constitutionally
required to demonstrate that she has (1) suffered an injury-in-fact to
a legally cognizable right, (2) where such injury is fairly traceable to
the defendant's actions, and (3) the relief requested by the plaintiff is
sufficient to redress her injury.29 While this seemingly compact and
Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), and Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 1250 (1984), all
discussed infra. For examples of the Rehnquist Court denying standing to
disfavored claims, see Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004)
(holding that the father of a school-aged child lacked standing to challenge a
school district's policy requiring teacher recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance
because he could not assert the rights of his daughter), and Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildkfe, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (holding that the injury alleged by an

environmental group, specifically that their ability to enjoy viewing endangered
species would be harmed by new government regulations, was too speculative

to qualify for Article III standing).
26 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
Id. at 153.
See, e.g., Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens,
529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83,
102-04 (1998); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders
27
28

of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
29

See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation

of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982) (stating that "the exercise of
judicial power, which can so profoundly affect the lives, liberty, and property
of those to whom it extends, is therefore restricted to litigants who can show
'injury in fact' resulting from the action which they seek to have the court
adjudicate"). The Court also has articulated a number of sub -constitutional
restrictions on federal court review. These additional standing limitations
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bright-line tripartite scheme is notoriously rife with ambiguity, bias,
and unpredictability,30 a few basic themes can be gleaned from some
of the Court's seminal decisions on standing.
First, the Court regularly has denied standing on the
grounds that the claimed injuries were speculative, conjectural, or
not tied to the actions of the defendant. While an "actual injury"
surely could suffice for standing purposes, the Court has long
recited the proposition that there must be a "real and immediate
threat" of a prospective injury to satisfy standing. 31 In the seminal,
and oft criticized, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildife decision, plaintiffs
challenged a policy adopted by the Secretary of the Interior that
rendered the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") applicable only to
actions occurring within the United States or on the high seas. 32
The section of the ESA relevant to the litigation requires federal
agencies to insure that their actions are "not likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of any endangered species." 33 The challenged
regulation in Lujan made that requirement inapplicable to actions by
federal agencies in foreign countries. 34
The plaintiffs, who were members of a national wildlife
organization, sued to invalidate the regulation under the citizen-suit
provisions of the ESA.35 One of the plaintiffs alleged that she had
"observed the traditional habitat of the endangered nile [sic]
crocodile" during her past travels to Egypt, and "intend[ed] to do so
again" in the future. 36 Thus, she argued that she "will suffer harm in
fact as a result of [the] American . . . role . . . in overseeing the

rehabilitation of the Answan High Dam on the Nile." 37 Another
usually are not argued to be derived from the "cases" and "controversies"
language of Article III, but rather reflect various "prudential" concerns. See
e.g., Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162-63 (zone of interests limitation); Valley Forge, 454
U.S. at 473-74 (generalized grievances limitation); Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S.
490, 499 (1975) (restriction on third-party standing).
30 See infra Part III.
31 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101-02 (1983).
32 504 U.S. 555, 557-58 (1992) (citing Endangered Species Act of
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. (
1531-37a, 1538-44 (1988)).
33 Id. at 558 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
34 Id. at 558-59 (citing 50 C.F.R. 402.01 (1991)).
35 Id. at 571-72. The citizen-suit provision of the ESA grants standing
to "any person" alleging a violation "of any provision of this chapter." 16
U.S.C. § 1540(g). For a critique of the Court's holding that the citizen-suit
provision of the ESA was not a sufficient congressional substitute for the
requirements of Article III standing, see generally Sunstein, supranote 14.
36 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563.
37 Id.
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plaintiff alleged that she had "observed th[e] habitat" of
"endangered species such as the Asian elephant and the leopard" in
Sri Lanka, and would like to do so again in the future.38
In a majority opinion authored by Justice Scalia, the Court
held that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the constitutional
requirement of injury. 39 The Court viewed the plaintiffs' allegations
of injury as a future "inten[t] to return to the places they had visited
before-where they will . . be deprived of the opportunity to
observe animals of the endangered species." 40 So framed, the Court
found the allegations of harm to be "pure speculation and
fantasy," 41 thus failing the standing requirement of an injury that is
"actual or imminent." 42
The Court expounded upon the Lujan treatment of
prospective injury in the Bennett v. Spear decision.43 In Bennett, the
plaintiffs challenged a biological opinion issued by the Fish and
Wildlife Service ("FWS") under provisions of the ESA.44 The ESA
requires the FWS to insure that their actions are not likely to
45
If an agencyjeopardize the existence of an endangered species.
such as the FWS-determines that an action in fact may affect a
species adversely, they are required to issue a "biological opinion"
stating how the action would affect the species and detailing any
"reasonable and prudent" alternatives to the acdon.46 In this case,
the FWS was notified that a water reclamation project might affect
two species of endangered fish.47 Accordingly, the FWS issued a
biological opinion stating that reducing the water levels on the
affected lakes would avoid jeopardizing the endangered fish species
during the operation of the reclamation project.48 The plaintiffs-

Id. at 563-64.
564. The Court also held that the requirement of
redressability had not been satisfied, in part because "the [federal] agencies
generally supply only a fraction of the funding" for the foreign projects, and
thus there was no reason to believe that those projects would be suspended if
the regulation was invalidated. Id. at 571.
40 Id. at 564.
41 Id. at 567.
42 Id. at 560. See also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142,
1150-51 (2009) (denying standing on the grounds that an intent to visit forests
in the future represented an insufficiently concrete injury).
43 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (Scalia,J.).
44 Id. at 157 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1536).
45 Id. at 158 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
46 Id. at 158 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A)).
47 Id. at 159.
48 Id
38

39 Id. at
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two Oregon irrigation districts that receive water from the
reclamation project-sued on the grounds that their use of the lakes
for "recreational, aesthetic and commercial purposes, as well as for
their primary sourceH of irrigation water" would be "irreparably
damaged" by the actions of the FWS.49
The Court began its analysis by reciting the mantra that
Article III required injuries to be "concrete and particularized," and
not "conjectural or hypothetical."5 0 The Court also acknowledged
the Government's contention that the plaintiffs did "not necessarily
establish (absent information concerning the Bureau's water
allocation practices) that petitioners will receive less water."51
Nonetheless, the Court held that the allegations of injury were
sufficient to invoke jurisdiction under Article 111.52 The Court
stressed that "the manner and degree of evidence required at the
successive stages of litigation" is relevant to the analysis of injury.53
Accordingly, the majority felt that "general factual allegations of
injury" made by the plaintiffs during the pleading stage were
sufficient to "presume [the] specific facts under which petitioners
will be injured." 54
The Lujan and Bennett decisions demonstrate just a few of
the doctrinal reiterations favored by the Court in its analysis of
Article III standing. The tools, slogans, and intonations that
standing doctrine has cultivated, however, are insufficient to resolve
predictably the critical question of access to justice.
A. Contemporary Justifications for the Doctrine of Standing
The classic justifications for modern standing doctrine
embody
two
central
themes:
separation-of-powers
and
representative democracy.
These jurisprudential perspectives
purport to impute meaning and purpose to the current standing
framework, a necessary task given that the Constitution does not by
its terms animate any notion of "standing." Nonetheless, these
classic theoretical defenses of standing suffer from well-documented
analytical flaws.

49

Id. at 160.

50 Id. at 167.

s1 Id.

Id. at 168.
53 Id. at 167-68.
54 Id. at 168. The Court also held that the alleged injury was fairly
traceable to the actions of the FWS, given that the issuance of a biological
opinion was a "virtually determinative effect" on agency action. Id. at 170.
52
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1. Separation-of-Powers Theories
Many regard the current law of standing as an essential limit
on the power of an unelected judiciary in a democratic society. The
Court's decision in Allen v. Warght is widely seen as the paradigmatic
example of a separation-of-powers defense of standing law.55 In
Allen, the parents of African-American children sued the Internal
Revenue Service on the grounds that its policy of providing taxexempt status to racially-segregated private schools violated their
constitutional rights, while simultaneously undermining their
children's ability to receive a desegregated public education.5 6 In
dismissing the action for want of an injury-in-fact or causation for
standing purposes, the Court clarified that a central purpose of the
Article III justiciability requirements was to ensure a "proper-and
properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."57 The
Court further elaborated on the reasoning underlying its denial of
standing:
All of the doctrines that cluster about Article Ill-not
only standing but mootness, ripeness, political
question, and the like-relate in part, and in different
though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is more
than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit
theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits
to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative
judiciary in our kind of government. 8
As many other commentators have noted, the Court
nonetheless has failed to connect the constitutional duty to maintain
an adequate separation-of-powers with the need to maintain rigid
standing requirements.5 9 In what ways are the requirements for

See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
Id. at 739-40. For a more thorough examination of the facts and
holding of the Allen case, see infra Part III.A.
57 Id. at 750 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 442 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)).
58 Id. (quoting Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178 (D.C. Cir.
1983)).
59 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory ofJusticiabiliy, 86 TEx. L. REv.
73, 96. Professor Siegel states: Allen v. Warght is therefore representative of
what might be called the ltse dixit version of the separation-of-powers theory
of justiciability. The Court appeals to an intuitive, incompletely articulated
sense that because courts should play a limited role in a democratic society,
whatever limits courts must be good and must protect us from excessive
judicial power . . . . [I]owever, not every conceivable limitation on judicial
proceedings can qualify as a constitutional purpose. We need some explanation
5s

56
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injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability tied to limiting excessive
power exercised by "activist courts"? Plaintiffs who satisfy these
requirements still can litigate important cases of national concern. 60
By way of example, the Court's infamous decision in the Chinese
Exclusion Case, 61 which upheld racial immigration restrictions while
establishing the "plenary power" doctrine, was perfectly justiciable,
as were the Court's decisions in other influential yet notorious cases
such as Dred Scott v. Sandford,62 Lochner V.New York, 63 and Korematsu V.
United States.64 The standing requirements also did not affect the
Court's ability to decide more recent cases of the utmost national
66
65
importance, such as Roe v. Wade, Griswold v. Connecticut, Lawrence v.
Texas,67 ParentsInvolved v. Seattle,68 Bush v. Gore,69 or CitiZens United v.

of why justiciability constraints are so critical to maintaining the proper limits
on the judicial role. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
60 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876
(2010) (holding that capping corporate spending on political advertising
violated the First Amendment right to free speech); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558 (2003) (holding that a state statute criminalizing homosexual activity
was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (finding a protected liberty
interest in a woman's right to choose to have an abortion and prohibiting state
restrictions on that right prior to the third trimester); Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966) (creating the now well-known "Miranda rights" that criminal

suspects must be apprised of when taken into custody); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a constitutional "right of privacy"
and invalidating a state statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives as a
violation of that right when applied to married couples); Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that segregation of public
schools violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding Executive Order
9066, which authorized the detention of Japanese Americans in internment
camps during World War II); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(holding that a statute imposing a maximum weekly hour requirement violated
the liberty interest in the "freedom to contract" in violation of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (upholding an Act of
Congress banning Chinese inunigration on the basis of the newly-formed
"plenary power" doctrine); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857)
(holding that African Americans are not citizens of the United States and thus
have no right to sue in the federal courts).
61 Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. at 599-600.
62

60 U.S. 393 (1857).

63

198
323
410
381
539

64
65
66
67

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

45 (1905).
214 (1944).
113 (1973).
479 (1965).
558 (2003).
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FederalElection Commission.70 All of these cases arguably satisfied the
current tripartite standing test, and yet they are examples of judicial
power affecting large segments of society. Therefore, the argument
that standing doctrine is necessary to maintain separation-of-powers
seems belied by the inherent disconnect between standing's rigid
requirements and the Court's constitutional duty to decide
important cases of national concern.
2.

Representational Theories

One classic defense of standing doctrine relies on the related
argument that the standing requirements are necessary to ensure that
the judicial process is controlled by plaintiffs with a sufficient stake
in the litigation.7 '
By restricting relief to those persons most
affected by the issues, the standing limitations serve the purpose of
maintaining the intrinsic fairness of an adequately representative
judicial process. As the Court has explained:
[T]he courts should not adjudicate such rights
unnecessarily, and it may be that in fact the holders of
those rights either do not wish to assert them, or will
be able to enjoy them regardless of whether the incourt litigant is successful or not . . . . The courts
depend on effective advocacy, and therefore should
prefer to construe legal rights only when the most
effective advocates of those rights are before them.72
The danger in allowing access to so-called "ideological" plaintiffs
lies in the stare decisis effect of prior litigation. An ideological
plaintiff, the argument goes, is more likely to frame a case broadly,
which perhaps leads to a poor result that will be potentially binding

68 551 U.S. 701 (2007) (prohibiting the assignment of school seats
based on race in order to achieve "racial balance" in public schools). Parents
Involved will be discussed in greater detail, infra Part III.B.
69 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (overturning a Florida Supreme Court decision
and ordering the suspension of the vote recount during the 2000 presidential

election).
70
71

130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 US. 727, 731-32 (1972) ("the

question of standing depends upon whether the party has alleged . . . a

'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy' ") (quoting Baker v.Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
72 Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113-14 (1976) (citation omitted).
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on more traditional plaintiffs. 73 Allowing such unaccountable
plaintiffs access to the federal courts, thus, would be unfair to
genuinely interested plaintiffs, whose rights may be impacted
negatively through the device of stare deCisis.74 Therefore, the
standing requirements "reflectH a due regard for the autonomy of
those persons likely to be most directly affected by a judicial
order."75
There are a number of critical flaws with the
representational defense of standing doctrine. Initially, it is clear
that the existing limitations on standing do not prevent litigation
from potentially impinging on the rights of genuinely affected nonparties. A case brought by a traditional plaintiff will affect the rights
of other genuinely interested parties7 6 in the same manner as a case
brought by an "ideological" plaintiff. In both instances, the rights
of nonpardes will be affected through the mechanism of stare decisis.
Furthermore, there is no valid reason to believe that a traditional
plaintiff would indeed tailor her litigation more craftily and narrowly
than an ideological plaintiff. It is certainly possible, for instance,
that a genuinely affected plaintiff may choose to follow a broadly
framed, ideological litigation strategy that potentially would bind the
rights of other nonparties.
As Professor Jonathan Siegel has
observed, "the problem of interested parties who find their rights
affected by litigation brought by others is simply intrinsic to our
legal system [and] [t]he justiciability requirements do little to avoid
it."77

A second criticism of the representational defense observes
that ideological plaintiffs are easily able to join a genuinely affected
group of plaintiffs in litigation, notwithstanding the requirements of
standing. Plaintiffs who are deemed to have an ideological interest
in a case according to the existing standing framework often can
take steps to become interested parties under the eyes of the law.
As Professor Cass Sunstein documented long ago, an individual's

73 Brilmayer, supra note 10, at 309 (noting "there are reasons to doubt
whether self-appointed ideological plaintiffs should be presumed to be
adequate representatives").
74

Id.

75 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982).
76 Brilmayer, supra note 10, at 306-10.
77 Siegel, supra note 59, at 92. Please review Professor Siegel's
excellent article for an exhaustive examination and critique of the current
theoretical justifications for the justiciability doctrines.
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preferences are rarely exogenous to the legal system.78 Rather, an
individual's desires and preferences are often "a function of legal
rules," shaped by the existing legal framework.79 In the case of
standing, it is well-established that even so-called ideological
plaintiffs can take strategic steps to ensure that the standing
requirements are satisfied.80
One final criticism of the representational defense, and of
standing doctrine more generally, deconstructs the seemingly brightline distinction between ideological and factual injuries.
The
historical shift in focus from legal injury to injury-in-fact requires
courts to distinguish between purely "ideological" injuries and
factual injuries. Allegations of injury that are classified as ideological
by a court are dismissed for lack of standing, while claims of injury
that appear to be concrete and particularized readily pass
constitutional muster.81 And yet to apply such a seemingly basic
distinction, courts inevitably must rely on a normative toolbox of
canons to ascertain what injuries should matter for Article III
purposes. As Professor Sunstein explains:
[TWhere are reasonably well-established conventions
on what counts as an injury, and these conventions
tend to disguise the normative judgments and make
them seem purely factual. But in every case, the
person who brings a lawsuit believes that she has
indeed suffered an injury in fact.82
The failings of theories based on notions of separation-ofpowers and representational democracy to adequately inform
standing doctrine is not surprising given the law's inherent
indeterminacy. The effort of reconciling the often conflicting and
nonsensical standing decisions requires moving beyond classic
constitutional theory and towards an acknowledgment of the role

78See generaly Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences,
53 U. Cm. L. REv. 1129 (1986).
79 Id. at 1137.
80 See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 59, at 93 (arguingthat one reason "why
the justiciability requirements do little to protect the 'most affected' individuals
is that ideological plaintiffs may take steps to join the affected group"); see also
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (recognizing that the plaintiffs likely could have satisfied the
standing requirements by taking the step of purchasing plane tickets or setting
definite plans to travel).
81 See infra Part III.
82 Sunstein, supra note 14, at 189.
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that ideology, race, and social inequality play in judicial decisionmaking.
III.

THE INDETERMINACY OF STANDING DOCTRINE

The indeterminate nature of standing doctrine is welldocumented. 83 Scores of scholars have decried the incoherence and
sophistry that dominate standing doctrine. 84 It is claimed that
standing law-and its 'worthless generalizations'8 5 -is but a tool for
judges to "provide access to the courts to individuals who seek to
further the political and ideological agendas of judges." 8 6
Furthermore, standing doctrine is a "conceptual mistake"87
resembling a "word game played by secret rules." 88 Empirical
studies have borne out these intuitions, establishing that the law of
standing is malleable and that outcomes are shaped by the
ideological preferences of individual judges.89
The charge that the law itself is inherently indeterminate
also necessarily informs our understanding of the ideological nature
of standing law.90 The claim of indeterminacy extends from the

83See, e.g., David N. Cassuto, The Law of Words: Standing, Environment,
and Other Contested Terms, 28 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 79 (2004); Kenneth Culp
Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601 (1968); William A.
Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Elizabeth Magill,
Standingfor the Public: A Lost Histoy, 95 VA. L. REV. 1131 (2009); Siegel, supra
note 59; Sunstein, supranote 14.
84See supranote 83 and accompanying text.
85 Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151
(1970) ("Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such.").
86Pierce, supranote 2, at 1743.
87Sunstein, supra note 14, at 167.
88Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
89See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 3, at 224-50; Sunstein, supra note 14, at
168-97; Pierce, supra note 2, at 1758-63; Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for
Privilege: The Failureof Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 338-40 (2002); see also
Gregory J. Rathjen & Harold J. Spaeth, DenialofAccess and IdeologicalPreferences:
An Analysis of the Voting Behavior of the Burger Court Justices, 1969-1976, W. POL.
Q., Mar. 1983, at 71; C.K. Rowland & Bridget Jeffery Todd, Where You Stand
Depends on Who Sits: Plaform Promises andJudicialGatekeeping in the FederalDistrict
Courts,J. POL., Feb. 1991, at 175; Nancy C. Staudt, Modedng Standing, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 612 (2004) (acknowledging that standing decisions are often based on
the judges' personal ideologies, yet arguing that standing doctrine is predictable
when clear precedent and judicial oversight exist).
90 See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 243 (1984); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law,
73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151 (1985); Clare Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of
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classic realist critique that the law cannot be applied mathematically
in a formalistic fashion, but rather is molded by complex social
forces. 91 It follows from this realist observation that legal rules
rarely, if ever, dictate a particular result: "[L]egal reasoning is
indeterminate and contradictory. By its own criteria, legal reasoning
cannot resolve legal questions in an 'objective' manner; nor can it
explain how the legal system works or how judges decide cases." 92
The observation that traditional legal reasoning is subject to both
the limits of language and the whims of judicial preference renders
the law and legal theory "infinitely manipulable" 93 and, thus,
indeterminate. 94
The purpose of this section, then, is to extend the
indeterminacy critique by examining recent cases involving racial
and class inequality in the affirmative action, desegregation,
integration, and racial profiling contexts. Situating the critique in the
inequality context provides an opportunity to decode the values and
principles influencing judicial decision-making through the use of a
critical race methodology. For the purposes of the indeterminacy
analysis, it is useful to break the case law discussion into two
categories: (a) those cases involving alleged racial injuries to nonwhite plaintiffs, and (b) those cases involving alleged racial injuries
to white plaintiffs.
A doctrinal comparison of these cases
demonstrates that the Court adopts an unnecessarily narrow
conception of injury and causation in racial claims of non-white
plaintiffs, while alternatively applying an unnecessarily broad
conception of injury and causation in cases involving the racial
claims of white plaintiffs.95
A. Of Black Injuries, Desegregation, and Profiling
The law of standing has been remarkably consistent in its
treatment of injuries by non-white plaintiffs in cases that implicate
ContractDoctrine, 94 YALE L.J. 997 (1985); Joseph William Singer, The Player and
the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984). See also supra note 1
and accompanying text.
91See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 8, at 812 ("Valuable as is the language of
transcendental nonsense for many practical purposes, it is entirely useless
when we come to study, describe, predict, and criticize legal phenomena.").
92 Singer, supra note 90, at 6.
93 Id
94 Id. at 24 ("[TWhe legal theories advanced to justify our rules and
institutions are indeterminate. The same theories could be used to justify very
different sorts of institutions and very different rules.").
9s The terms "racial claims" and "racial injuries" refer broadly to
cases involving allegations of racial discrimination.
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racial inequality.
In the desegregation, integration, and racial
profiling contexts, the Court has narrowly construed the concepts of
injury, causation, and redressability to deny attempts to undermine
the racial status quo.
An early test of the Court's modern standing framework
involved litigation challenging exclusionary residential zoning
practices. In Warth v. Seldin, various plaintiff groups challenged the
zoning restrictions of the small upstate New York town of
Penfield.96 The plaintiffs-consisting of taxpayers, residents, lowincome individuals, and homebuilders-alleged that the zoning
restrictions violated their constitutional rights by effectively
excluding low-income, often non-white, persons from residing in
the town. 97 The Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims on standing
grounds. First, the Court rejected the taxpayer group's claim that
the town's refusal to build low-income housing caused their
neighboring town of Rochester to provide more housing of that
type, resulting in higher taxes for property owners.98 The Court
viewed this injury as merely "conjectural," finding that "the line of
causation between Penfield's actions and such injury [was] not
apparent from the complaint."9 9
The Court similarly dismissed the claims of the Penfield
residents, who argued that the town's exclusionary zoning policy
deprived them "of the benefits of living in a racially and ethnically
integrated community."10 0 According to the Court, the claimed
injury was simply not judicially cognizable-even though a different
set of plaintiffs prevailed on a very similar claim under the 1968
Civil Rights Act in a previous case.101 The Court also did not find
the injury of the low-income set of plaintiffs-the inability to find
affordable housing in Penfield-to satisfy Article III, as the
plaintiffs could not demonstrate "a substantial probability that they
would have been able to" reside in Penfield absent the zoning
policy. 102 Finally, the court rejected the claims of the homebuilders
on the grounds that the injury was prospective. 103

96
97

Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Id. at 493.

98 Id. at 496-97.
99 Id. at 509.
100 Id. at 512.

101Id. at 512-14 (distinguishing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.,
409 U.S. 205 (1972)).
102 Id. at 504.
103

Id.
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Neither precedent nor the requirements of Article III,
however, warranted the rigid interpretations of injury and causation
adopted by the Court in Warth.104 The harms suffered by the War/h
plaintiffs could have been found justiciable if the Court had
followed its precedent in the Trafficante case, which allowed standing
based on injuries linked to the "benefits of interracial
association." 05
The Court's unnecessarily stringent view of
causation in Warth also has not comported with the Court's other
decisions on standing. In Bennett v. Spear, for instance, the Court
quite generously "presum[ed] the existence of injury-in-fact and
causation based on the averments made in the complaint."10 6 The
allegations of harm and causation made in Warth clearly could have
been "presumed" sufficient under the lax framework employed in
Bennett. 107
The Court again adopted a harsh construction of the
requirements of standing in Allen v. Wrght.1 os Allen represents an
effort to further the desegregation mandate of Brown v. Board of
Education10 9 by eliminating federal tax benefits to racially
discriminatory private schools. Following Brown, scores of white
parents pulled their children out of integrating public schools in
order to enroll them in racially exclusionary private schools. 110
While these private schools actively encouraged and benefited from
"white flight," 111 the federal Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") at the
time nonetheless extended tax-exempt status to many such schools
in contravention of its own stated policy.11 2 Accordingly, a group of
parents of black children enrolled in desegregating public schools
filed a national class action suit against the IRS. The Court framed
104

See infra Part III.B; see also Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro.

Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
Traficante,409 U.S. at 209-10.
See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 168 (1997) (construing the
allegations of injury and causation contained in the complaint to "presume"
105
106

justiciability).
107 See id.
108Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
109Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 518 (1980).
111 Viviva Pierre & Madeline Herbert, Beyond Brown: LouisianaLayer

Discusses the East Baton Rouge Desegregation Suit and its Relation to Brown v. Board
of Education, SPECTRUM MAGAZINE, Apr. 2004, at 15.
112 Allen, 468 U.S. at 743. The court noted, "[t]he IRS denies taxexempt status under §§ 501(a) and (c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 26
U.S.C. §§ 501(a) and (c)(3) ... to racially discriminatory private schools." Id. at
740.
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the alleged injuries as consisting of (1) stigmatic harm and
denigration due to the ongoing government aid provided to racially
discriminatory schools, and (2) a diminished ability to receive an
education in a racially integrated school.113
The Court held that the first injury-which they
alternatively interpreted as a request for the Government to avoid
violating the law-was not judicially cognizable based on
precedent.11 4 According to the Court, the plaintiffs had not
adequately alleged a "concrete" injury since their children had never
been excluded from any of the racially discriminatory schools.
Under this construction, the Court would require parents to subject
their children to racial exclusion from a private school before
finding the existence of a sufficiently particularized injury-in-fact. 115
The second injury alleged by the parents was also rejected as too
"abstract" and "speculative" to satisfy Article III's rigid standing
requirements.1 6 In particular, the Court found it to be "entirely
speculative" whether the remedy sought would "have a significant
impact on the racial composition of the public schools," and that
the plaintiffs thus could not establish that the acts of the IRS were
fairly traceable to a diminished ability to attend a desegregated
school.117
The injuries complained of in Allen could have been found
justiciable if the Court adopted the broad construction of injury and
causation applied in cases seeking to vindicate the interests of white
plaintiffs to not be subject to race-conscious programs. 118 The
Id. at 754, 756.
Id. at 755.
115Id. at 756 (The Court believed that a finding of injury under the
113
114

facts would "transform the federal courts into 'no more than a vehicle for the
vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.'" (quoting United
States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687 (1973))).
116 Id. at 756, 758.
117 Id. at 758-59.
118 See infra Part III.B; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S.
265 (1978) (holding that white medical school applicant granted standing did
not have to establish that the affirmative action policy was the but-for cause of
his denial of admission and that the state has a legitimate interest in
considering race in admissions, but it must be narrowly tailored and only one
of many factors in a competitive process); Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen.
Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993) (where contractors
association challenged city ordinance giving preference to minority-owned
businesses, petitioner had shown injury-in-fact because of the city's imposed
barrier to obtain a benefit and need not prove that it would have obtained the
benefit but for the barrier); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995) (holding that plaintiff need not allege that it would have benefited but
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injury in Allen, thus, could have been framed expansively as "the
opportunity to have a desegregation process unaffected by unlawful
incentives for white flight" 119 by using the same contrived logic that
buttresses the Court's and-affirmative action and desegregation
cases. 120
The Court also has strictly interpreted the limits of the
standing requirements in racial profiling cases. In Ciy of Los Angeles
v. Lyons, the Court dismissed a case seeking injunctive relief for
injuries stemming from police misconduct. 121 The dissent by Justice
Marshall inimitably summarizes the unchallenged facts of the case:
[Adolph] Lyons [an African-American male] was pulled
over to the curb by two officers of the Los Angeles
Police Department (LAPD) for a traffic infraction
because one of his taillights was burned out. The
officers greeted him with drawn revolvers as he exited
from his car. Lyons was told to face his car and spread
his legs. He did so. He was then ordered to clasp his
hands and put them on top of his head. He again
complied. After one of the officers completed a patdown search, Lyons dropped his hands, but was ordered
to place them back above his head, and one of the
officers grabbed Lyons' hands and slammed them onto
his head. Lyons complained about the pain caused by
the ring of keys he was holding in his hand. Within five
to ten seconds, the officer began to choke Lyons by
applying a forearm against his throat.
As Lyons
struggled for air, the officer handcuffed him, but
continued to apply the chokehold until he blacked out.
When Lyons regained consciousness, he was lying face
down on the ground, choking, gasping for air, and
spitting up blood and dirt. He had urinated and

for the discriminatory classification that gave preference to minority-owned
businesses to receive standing and that equal protection claims under both the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require strict scrutiny analysis); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (granting lead plaintiff standing because she had

been denied undergraduate admission and holding that an admissions policy
that made race the decisive factor was unconstitutional); see also Parents
Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
119 Cass R. Sunstein, Standing Injuries, 1993 SUP. CT. REv. 37, 50
(1993).
120 See infra Part IV.B.
121 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 95 (1983).
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defecated.
released.122

He was

140

issued a traffic citation and

Notwithstanding the disturbingly routine nature of the
case, 123 the majority dismissed the action for lack of standing on the
grounds that Lyons could not demonstrate "a sufficient likelihood
that [he] would again be stopped and subjected to the unlawful use
of force to constitute a case or controversy."1 24 The Court simply
could not fathom the "incredible assertion" that police officers
might again racially profile and physically assault Lyons sometime in
the future.125 In the eyes of the majority, the injury claimed by
Lyons was too speculative to constitute a justiciable case or
controversy. 126
The harms arising from racial profiling, however, are clearly
not "speculative" to the individuals who are the targets of such
policies.
Such an indifferent understanding of the physical,
emotional, and dignitary injuries suffered by non-white victims of
Id. at 114-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why
'Driving While Black" Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265, 277-85 (1999) (citing data
from New Jersey, Maryland, and Ohio that reveals the prevalence of racial
profiling in traffic stops). Specifically, Harris refers to studies conducted by
Dr. John Lamberth, which revealed that 73.2% of those stopped and arrested
in New Jersey were African American despite the fact that only 13.5% of the
cars on the road had an African American driver or passenger. Id. at 279
(citation omitted). Similar studies in Maryland and Ohio have produced
virtually indistinguishable results. Id. at 280-85 (citations omitted).
124 Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111.
125 Id. at 106 (stating that they cannot agree that the "odds" that
Lyons not only would be stopped for a traffic violation again but also would
be subjected to a chokehold without any provocation whatsoever are sufficient
to make out a federal case for equitable relief).
126 The Lons case has not been the only case to rigidly interpret
injury and causation in the racial profiling context. See, e.g., Chavez v. Ill. State
Police, 27 F. Supp. 2d 1053 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (dismissing racial profiling case
brought by non-white motorists on the grounds that the injury was too
speculative and that there was not a sufficient likelihood that the non-white
motorists would be pulled over by the police again on the basis of race);
Kirkland v. Morgievich, Civ. No. 04-1651, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33808
(D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2005) (same); see also Curtis v. City of New Haven, 726 F.2d
65, 68 (2d Cir. 1984) (plaintiff lacked standing to challenge use of mace by
police); Davis v. City of Aurora, 705 F. Supp. 2d 1243 (D. Colo. 2010)
(plaintiff lacked standing to challenge racial profiling policy which led to
unlawful detention); Jones v. Bowman, 664 F. Supp. 433, 438-39 (N.D. Ind.
1987) (holding that plaintiff lacked standing to enjoin police officers from
performing strip searches); John Does 1-100 v. Boyd, 613 F. Supp. 1514, 1529
(D. Minn. 1985) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge
continuing practice of anal cavity searches of prisoners).
122

123
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police violence demonstrates the wholly subjective nature of the
standing analysis. The Court in Lyons failed to recognize the
extremely high incidence of racial profiling against minoritieS1 27 in its
causation analysis, as well as the fact that "the use of racial profiling
by law enforcement authorities in the United States has long been
permitted and encouraged, if not expressly authorized, by U.S.
constitutional law." 128 It seems that the injuries in Lyons would have
been regarded as justiciable had the Court applied the more
generous standing framework that it employed in other cases.
The results in these three cases neither were predictable nor
followed from reason based on the existing framework. The Court's
narrow interpretation of injury and causation in these cases runs
counter to established precedent and indicates either outright
disregard or contempt for the racialized injuries suffered by nonwhite plaintiffs. A doctrinal comparison of these outcomes to those
in other cases involving the racialized injuries of white plaintiffs will
illustrate further the indeterminacy of standing doctrine in racebased cases.
B. Of White Injuries, Innocence, and Merit
While the Court has adopted a rigid interpretation of the
requirements for standing in cases brought by non-white plaintiffs
suffering injuries based on racial inequality, the Court has relied on a
much looser interpretation of injury and causation in cases brought
by white "victims" of race-based remedial admissions, employment,
and desegregation programs.
The Court's decision on standing in Regents of University of
Caifornia v. Bakke129 paved the way for constitutional challenges to
affirmative-action and other race-conscious remedial programs. In
Bakke, the plaintiff, Alan Bakke, challenged the affirmative action
policy at the medical school of the University of California at Davis.
The Court found the case to be justiciable, even though it was
undisputed that Bakke could not demonstrate that he would have
been admitted to the school in the absence of the challenged
127Melissa Whitney, The Statistical Eidence of Racial Prfiling in Traffic
Stops and Searches: Rethinking the Use of Statistics to Prove Discriminatoy Intent, 49

B.C. L. REv. 263, 264 (2008) (noting that Bureau of Justice statistics released in
2005 demonstrated that minority drivers were three times as likely as white
drivers to be stopped by the police and searched).
128Kevin Johnson, How RacialProfilingin America Became the Law of the
Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and United States v. Whren and the Need
for Truly Rebellious Layering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1006 (2010).
129 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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policy.130 In fact, it was almost assured that Bakke would not have
been admitted to the school, regardless of the existence of the
policy. The Court acknowledged as much, noting that Bakke's
faculty interviewer had given him a very low interview score, and
that his "application had come late in the year, and no applicants in
the general admissions process with scores below 470 were accepted
after Bakke's application was completed [Bakke had a score of
468]."131 Nonetheless, the Court determined that Bakke's case
satisfied the requirements of Article III standing. The Court limited
its analysis to a single footnote in a fractured plurality opinion. 132
Rejecting the contention from various amid that the case lacked
standing due to Bakke's admitted inability to establish either
causation or redressability, the Court broadly refrained the injury as
being denied the abstract opportunity to "compete for all [of the
available] places in the class, simply because of his race." 133
The decision to grant standing in this case, however,
conflicted with the Court's narrow construction of standing in its
other cases. The Court in Bakke, for instance, relied on its recent
decision in Wart v. Seldin as precedent for its holding on standing. 134
However, as previously noted, the Court in Warth utilized a much
narrower conception of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability
than it applied in the Bakke case. The Wart precedent alone
indicates that the case should have been dismissed on standing
grounds since Bakke's injury was "conjectural," and because the
Court itself acknowledged that Bakke could not establish a causal
link between his denial of admission and the race-based policy. 135
Bakke was clearly unable to demonstrate that there was "a
substantial probability" of admission but for the race-based
policy. 136 The Court in Bakke, however, avoided this clear dictate of
precedent by broadly interpreting the injury claimed by Bakke.
Rather than frame the injury as being denied admission due to his
race-which is how Bakke framed the injury in his complaint-the
Court re-envisioned the injury as being forced to compete in a racebased application process. By doing so, the Court was able to claim
that the mere existence of such a race-based policy could give rise to
130 Id.

at 280 n.14 (stating "even if Bakke had been unable to prove

that he would have been admitted in the absence of the special program, it
would not follow that he lacked standing").
131 Id. at 276-77.
132 See id. at 280 n.14
133 Id.
134 Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)).
135 See id. at 270.
136 See id.
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an injury within the meaning of Article III.137 Under the Bakke
construction of standing, "it seems sufficient that the plaintiff
somehow believes that a program has harmed him, even if, in fact, it
has not," in order to establish a justiciable theoretical loss. 13 8
After retreating to a narrower construction of injury in
Allen, the Court reinvigorated its convoluted Bakke logic to allow
standing in a series of cases brought by white plaintiffs challenging
affirmative-action policies intended to benefit underrepresented
minorities. In both NortheasternFloridaChapterof the Associated General
Contractors . Ciy of Jacksontille140 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. .
Pena,141 the Court refused to require proof that the white plaintiffs
would have been awarded construction contracts if the set-aside
remedial programs did not exist. In fact, the lower court in
Northeastern dismissed the case on the grounds that the plaintiffs
could not make such a showing,142 as past precedent required. In
these cases, however, the Court disingenuously sidestepped the
demands of stare decisis by reconfiguring the claimed injuries as
"being forced to compete in a race-based system." 143 Once again,
the harms alleged in these cases were merely theoretical and
abstract-the type of "injuries" regularly held to be non-justiciable
in other contexts. As Professor Nichol succinctly observes, "the
Court apparently thinks that concrete, particularized harm is less
essential in cases alleging that government programs impermissibly
benefit racial minorities.
In such situations, rigorous standing
requirements do not apply."1 44
139

The Court continued to display a sympathetically lenient
view of standing in the seminal University of Michigan affirmative
action cases. In Grat. . Bollinger, for instance, the Court held that a
prospective white student-Patrick Hamacher-had standing to

137 Sunstein,

140

supranote 14, at 203.
supranote 89, at 311.
See infra Part IV.A.
508 U.S. 656 (1993).

141

515 U.S. 200 (1995).

138 Nichol,
139

Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City
of Jacksonville, 951 F.2d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1992); see also Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 516-17 (1975); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 746 (1984); City of
Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111(1983).
143 Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen. Contractors of Am., 508
U.S. at 656, 666 (an injury-in-fact exists "[w]hen the government erects a
barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a
benefit than it is for members of another group").
144 Nichol, supranote 89, at 311-12.
142
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challenge Michigan's affirmative action policy.145
In seeking
injunctive relief, precedent required Hamacher to establish a "real
and immediate" threat of a future injury. 146 The majority found that

Hamacher had satisfied this requirement even though he never
applied to transfer after being initially rejected. 147 Given the fact
that Hamacher had graduated already from a neighboring college, he
lacked the intent to transfer to the University of Michigan. 148 Thus,
it would appear that the existing precedent and interpretation of the
injury requirement would compel the Court to find that Hamacher's
claim of future injury must be dismissed as conjectural and
hypothetical.149 The Court, however, gave short shrift to the clear
deduction that Hamacher lacked a "personal stake" in the outcome.
Rather, the Court strangely reasoned that "whether Hamacher
'actually applied' for admission as a transfer student [was] not
determinative" of the standing issue since Hamacher may have
possessed a past intent to apply to the college if the admissions
policy was eliminated. 150
The broad construction of injury and causation enjoyed by
plaintiffs challenging affirmative action policies also has extended to
white parents challenging public school desegregation plans. In
ParentsInvolved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District 1, the Court
entertained claims that the desegregation plans adopted by the
Seattle, Washington, and Louisville, Kentucky, school systems
violated the constitutional rights of white children denied admission
to the public school of their future choosing. 151 The desegregation
plans in question allowed children to enroll freely in neighborhood
schools without regard to race. The consideration of race became
relevant only when a popular school became "oversubscribed"
under the Seattle plan or if a school became racially imbalanced
under the Louisville plan.152 The parents alleged an injury under
these plans stemming from the possibility that their children
someday would try to enroll in either an oversubscribed or a racially
imbalanced school, and that those students may be denied
admission based on race.153

145
146

539 U.S. 244, 260-61 (2003).
Id. See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560

(1992).
Grat- 539 U.S. at 260-61.
Id. at 286 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149 Id. See also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
150 Grat5 539 U.S. at 260-61.
1s1 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
152 Id. at 710-11.
153 Id. at 718.
147
148
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When the author of this Article teaches standing to the
students in his Federal Courts course, he often assigns a more
detailed factual summary of the Parents Involved decision to use as a
classroom exercise. The students invariably have concluded-based
on their analysis of the seminal standing cases reviewed during the
semester-that the plaintiffs in Parents Involved have not satisfied the
standing requirements of Article III. These students-quite bright
and engaged for their part-confidently proclaim that standing fails
on these facts since the claimed injury is merely speculative and
conjectural, in the same vein of the Lujan and Allen decisions.
However, these students are quickly disabused of their enchantment
for the law of standing when they are informed that the Court found
that this case satisfied the requirements for standing.
Relying on a very broad interpretation of the alleged injury,
the Roberts Court found that the white parents had standing in
Parents Involved. The injury, according to the Court, remains even if
the plaintiffs' children never decide to apply to a school subject to a
desegregation plan, or even if those children apply but are not
denied admission to the school of their choosing.154 Thus, the
Court did not frame the injury as an actual or "real and immediate
threat" of a denial of admission based on race. 155 Rather, the Court
relied on its past and-affirmative action standing decisions to
conceive of the injury broadly as "being forced to compete in a racebased system that may prejudice the plaintiff."15 6 Framed as such,
the Court found little trouble in identifying an injury sufficient for
Article III purposes.
The framework that the Court established to adjudicate
issues of standing does not readily explain or justify results in these
cases. The analysis of standing in cases claiming racial harms to
white plaintiffs suffers from an overly broad visualization of injuryin-fact, causation, and redressability. In contrast, the analysis of
standing in cases presenting injuries to non-white plaintiffs
challenging structures of racial inequality fails due to an
unnecessarily narrow interpretation of the standing requirements.
The indeterminacy plaguing standing doctrine, however, does not
fully explain the Court's protection of economic and racial privilege.

Id. at 718-19.
See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984); Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 583 (1992).
156 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 719 (citing Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 212 (1995) and Ne. Fla. Chapter of Associated Gen.
Contractors of Am. v. City ofJacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993)).
154
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The failure of structural theories of justiciability to give
purpose and meaning to the law of standing, coupled with the
doctrine's remarkable indeterminacy, inexorably leads to one
question: What is guiding the content of standing jurisprudence?
Phrased differently, what are the social forces, values, and principles
that influence judicial decision-making on standing issues? As has
been discussed, the Court's standing jurisprudence indicates hostility
to the rights and injuries of non-white plaintiffs, while displaying
sympathy for the rights and injuries of white plaintiffs. As Professor
Nichol observes:
Minority plaintiffs, poor litigants, unwed mothers,
black prisoners, and indigent patients get the harshest
treatment in injury law. Their burdens are higher,
their barriers more substantial. They must prove
greater consequential harms, must show closer
causation links, and must surmount greater
redressability hurdles. Article III determinations are
driven neither by text nor history. They favor the
powerful. They disadvantage the powerless. And in
the process, they don't explain why they do so.
The one predictable aspect of the Court's standing doctrine
thus appears to be the protection of racial and economic privilege. 5 8
A. Social Justification Theory, Privilege, and Threats to the
Status Quo
The conclusion that standing doctrine submits to the
demands of privilege is supported by the findings of social
psychology. System Justification Theory ("SJT"), a well-respected
and empirically-tested field of social psychology, posits that "people
are motivated to accept and perpetuate features of existing social
arrangements, even if those features were arrived at accidentally,
arbitrarily, or unjustly." 59 The central premise of SJT therefore
follows the classic Marxian view that members of the elite class have

157Nichol, supranote 89, at 333.
15s See id.

159 Gary Blasi & John T. Jost, System Justfication Theog and Research:
Implicationsfor Law, Legal Advocag, and Social Justice, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1119,
1124 (2006).
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an ideological interest in preserving current social structures. 160
While members of the subordinated class have an interest in
subverting the social system, this interest is sublimated by an
internalized "false consciousness" that cloaks inequality while
legitimizing the status quo.161
SJT incorporates these insights in an effort to analyze the
social tendency to rationalize the status quo and perceive existing
legal, social, economic, and political arrangements as "fair and
legitimate." 162 According to numerous empirical studies, individuals
are motivated to justify the status quo for several reasons, including
a "cognitive-motivational need to believe in order, structure, closure,
stability, predictability, consistency, and control." 63 Additionally,
studies have demonstrated that "there are social norms that serve to
uphold system-justifying responses and punish system-challenging
responses."1 64 Those daring few who challenge system expectations
and stereotypes are met with public backlash and ridicule.165
The tendency to engage in system-justification depends, to
varying degrees, on both situational and dispositional factors. 166
These tendencies will be activated to the extent that a person feels
the need to reduce uncertainty and system threat, or when the status
quo is directly or indirectly challenged.167 Perhaps unsurprisingly,
studies in SJT have demonstrated that individuals with conservative

160 See generaly Anthony Paul Farley, The Colorline as Capitalist
Accumulation, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 953 (2008).
161 See generall id.
162 John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, Antecedents and Consequences of
System-Justifing Ideologies, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. Sci. 260, 260
(2005).
163 Aaron C. Kay et al., Panglossian Ideology in the Service of System
Justification: How Complementary Stereotypes Help Us to Rationalie Inequality, 39
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 305, 308 (2007).
164 Id.

Id. (citing studies).
John T. Jost et al., System Justfication as Conscious and Nonconscious
Goal Pursuit, in HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION SCIENCE 591, 592 (James Y.
Shah & Wendi L. Gamer eds., 2008) [hereinafter Jost et al., Goal Pursuit]. See
also Blasi & Jost, supra note 159, at 1138; John T. Jost et al., Shared Realiy,
System Justification and the Relational Basis of Ideological Beliefs, 2 SoC. &
PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPAss 171, 172 (2007) ("[P]eople defend and
bolster the legitimacy of the societal status quo following exposure to various
manipulations of system threat, including exposure to . . . crises of legitimacy
or stability in society.").
167 See Blasi & Jost, supra note 159, at 1123.
165
166
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viewpoints are more likely to express system-justifying attitudes than
individuals with a self-described progressive or liberal viewpoint. 168
The appeal of system justification is straightforward: It
provides a coping mechanism for persons confronted with systemic
inequality by 'reducing anxiety and uncertainty.' 169 This finding is
similar to the psychological concept of "cognitive dissonance,"
which holds that people suffer from psychological tension when
confronted with ideas that conflict with their own beliefs.170 As the
author of this Article has stated previously in the reparations
context: "Confronting privilege creates cognitive dissonance by
acknowledging that benefits and advantages received were not
necessarily the result of merit and hard work, while exposing the
deeply held values that have supported privilege."171 Indeed, the
"potential psychic damage to privilege holders forces most to ignore
and suppress alternative explanations for their status that depart
from the assumption of naturalness and neutrality."1 72 Therefore,
holders of privilege have a strong motivation to express systemjustifying attitudes, as "[a]cceptance of traditional distinctions tend
to reduce cognitive dissonance."1 73 The palliative function of system
justification that SJT identifies thus maps neatly onto the critical
observation of the role that cognitive dissonance plays in the
maintenance of privilege. 174
Studies in SJT also have established that individuals faced
with system threat "may not even be aware of the extent to which
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1141.
170 See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE (1957).
171 Christian B. Sundquist, CriticalPraxis, Spirit Healing and Community
Activism: Preserving a Subversive Dialogue on Reparations, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
168
169

AM. L. 659, 675-76 (2003).

172 Peggy McIntosh, White Priilege andMale Privilege: A PersonalAccount
of Coming to See CorrespondencesThrough Work, in WOMEN'S STUDIES, IN POWER,
PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER 22, 23 (Leslie Bender & Dana
Braveman eds., 1995). See also James Thuo Gathii & Greg Mandel, Cost-Benefit
Analysis Versus the PrecautionaryPrinciple:Beyond Cass Sunstein's Laws of Fear, 2006
U. ILL. L. REV. 1037, 1049 n.53 (2006) (noting that the presence of cognitive
dissonance encourages people to take steps to eliminate the psychological
conflict, often by changing their preferences or beliefs).
173 Sunstein, supranote 78, at 1147.
174 The palliative function of system justification "provides a simple
and easy way of meeting a variety of psychological needs. Threats to the
legitimacy or stability of the system, on the other hand, may elicit feelings of
anxiety, uncertainty, and dissonance concerning one's role in the larger
system." Jost et al., GoalPursuit,supra note 166, at 598.
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they are privileging the status quo and resisting change."175 Such
attitudes are "especially likely to be manifested implicitly rather than
explicitly" given that "some forms of system justification efforts are
not normatively acceptable, such as stereotyping of and
discrimination against low-status groups." 176 The conclusion that
system-justifying attitudes are often unconsciously expressed tracks
the critical observation that discriminatory racial attitudes are often
the product of unconscious processes.177
B. From the Descriptive to the Normative: SJT, Critical
Theory, and the Law of Standing
The insights provided by SJT are invaluable to
understanding the indeterminacy that has come to define standing
doctrine. The concepts within SJT provide the necessary empirical
tools to deconstruct and analyze the privileging effects of standing
law. The subjective structure of standing law encourages the
expression of system-justifying attitudes and norms, and it also
accounts for the varying interpretations of injury, causation, and
redressability adopted by the Supreme Court.
The issues of racial and economic inequality faced by the
Court, including affirmative action, desegregation, integration, and
racial profiling, surely qualify under SJT as actual or perceived
"system threats" challenging the status quo. The Court's antiaffirmative action and desegregation jurisprudence provides a salient
example. The policies involved in those cases posed threats to the
legitimacy of the system by exposing pervasive inequality and
discrimination in the distribution of resources, education, and
employment. These situational antecedents can in turn trigger a
cognitive-motivational need to utilize system-justifying schemassuch as meritocratic, fair market, or "social dominance"
175 Jost et al., Goal Pursuit, supra note 166, at 596 (citing "several
studies" that have confirmed the "unconscious operation of system-justifying
biases").
176 Id.
177 See, e.g., Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconsdous Radsm, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987)

("Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about
racial matters are influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized
as neither intentional-in the sense that certain outcomes are self-consciously
sought-nor unintentional-in the sense that the outcomes are random,
fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decisionmaker's beliefs, desires, and
wishes."); Donna Young, Raial Releases, Involuntag Separations, and Employment
at Will, 34 LOy. L.A. L. REv. 351, 398 (2001) (noting that "the courts have
been unable to properly address the 'unconscious' component of racism").
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ideologies-in order to justify inequality and rationalize the status
quo.178
Exposure to such system distortions can lead to tears in the
shroud of false consciousness that can be mended only through
rationalization of existing inequality and resistance to changes in the
status quo.179 These psychological processes often-but certainly
not always-occur at an unconscious level. They can lead decision
makers to suppress alternative explanations of inequality that
conflict with their particular worldview in order to avoid the psychic
pain of recognizing privilege.
In particular, studies have
demonstrated that the process of rationalization is often marked by
the tendency to "accept meritocratic explanations for inequality and
to blame individuals rather than systems for the existence of
poverty."180
The reduction of cognitive dissonance is enabled by the
indeterminate nature of the standing requirements. As we have
seen, the determination of injury, causation, and redressability are
"normative endeavors," informed by the "sense of unity and
identity" of the decision maker. 181 A recognition of the language of
"transcendental nonsense" 182 employed by the Court in its standing
decisions accounts for the hostility shown to injuries claimed by
non-white plaintiffs challenging racial inequality. The Court simply
cannot empathize with injuries and claims that conflict with its
colorblind view of the world. The Court's narrow construction of
injury, causation, and redressability in these cases alleviates the
psychological distress caused by its being confronted with images of
privilege and inequality. Simply put, the Court finds solace in
viewing challenges to racial hierarchy as fantastical conjecture having
little bearing to "real-world" injuries-in-fact.
For example, the harms alleged by the plaintiffs in Lyons
posed a strong threat to the status quo appearance of race neutrality
178

See Jost & Hunyady, supra note 162, at 260-61.

179 Id.
180 Tom R. Tyler & John T. Jost, Pychology and the Law: Reconciling
Normative and DescriptiveAccounts of Social Justice and System Legitimacy, in SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY: HANDBOOK OF BASIC PRINCIPLES 816 (A.W. Kruglanski &
E.T. Higgins eds., 2007) (citations to corroborating studies omitted). The

reduction of cognitive dissonance also is often accompanied by a belief in freemarket ideology and the perception that market-based outcomes are efficient
and fair. Id.
181

See, e.g., JOSEPH VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY: THE COMING AGE OF

PUBLIC LAW 171 (1978); Fletcher, supra note 3, at 221-23 (1988); Nichol, supra
note 89, at 322-24.
182 See Cohen, supra note 8, at 812.
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by exposing widespread practices of racial profiling.183
A
recognition of these injuries as "real" and "concrete" conflicted with
the Court's belief in colorblindness and equal opportunity-that
law-abiding individuals are generally treated equally by law
enforcement, without regard to race. 184 In other words, it conflicted
with the belief, that the system is just and fair, and that racism is a
mere aberration rather than a systemic flaw. 85 The Court resolved
the cognitive dissonance created by this ideological conflict by
narrowly construing the standing requirements as preventing
"speculative" allegations of systemic failure. 186 To view pervasive
racism and police mistreatment of black men as a speculative and
"discrete practice" is to view racial discrimination as aberrational
and non-threatening to the status quo.
The system justification discourse on standing doctrine also
explains why the Court is willing to embrace cases brought by white
plaintiffs seeking to maintain the status quo of race neutrality and
professed post-racialism. The Court reduces the cognitive costs
implicit in any confrontation of privilege by striking down raceregarding measures in the name of equal opportunity, meritocracy,
and colorblindness. Rationalization of the status quo leads to
empathy for members of the dominant group, whose allegations of
injury are re-interpreted by the Court as efforts to dispel threats to
the status quo.
Therefore, the Court invokes the systemmaintaining ideologies of equal opportunity, colorblindness, white
innocence, meritocracy, and individualism to inform its standing
analysis, as well as to rationalize the conclusion that otherwise
speculative and hypothetical injuries satisfy the justiciability
requirements.
For instance, the Court's decisions in Bakke and Parents
Involved clearly demonstrate the Court's readiness to act on system
justification motives in order to protect the status quo. The plaintiff
in the Bakke case sought to eliminate a serious threat to the
system-race-regarding admission policies that sought to remedy
current and past discrimination and stem the rising tide of inequality.
The affirmative action policy at issue conflicted with numerous
183

City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 98 (1983).

See id. at 108 (holding that "it is untenable to assert, and the
complaint made no such allegation, that strangleholds are applied by the Los
184

Angeles police to every citizen who is stopped or arrested regardless of the
conduct of the person stopped").
18 RICHARD DELGADO
& JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 7 (2001) (noting that a basic tenet of critical race

theory is that "racism is ordinary, not aberrational").
186 Lons, 461 U.S. at 109.
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"system-justifying ideologies,"' 87 such as a belief in meritocracy, 188
individualism, a fair market, 8 9 natural economic and racial
inequality,190 colorblindness, equal opportunity, and social
dominance.191 As noted earlier, 192 it was undisputed in Bakke that
the plaintiff could not demonstrate that he would have been
admitted to the medical school at UC-Davis but for the existence of
the remedial admissions policy.193 Despite the speculative and
hypothetical nature of Bakke's "injury," which otherwise the Court
would have deemed as non-justiciable under precedent, the Court
sympathized with the discrimination facing "disadvantaged
whites"1 94 and permitted the attempt to preserve the status quo.
The Court rationalized its finding of standing by re-framing the
injury as a threat to the status quo of equal opportunity. 195
The seemingly benign framework of equal opportunity was
invoked by the Court as an antecedent to system justification. 196 As
the author of this Article has contested previously,
The story of equal opportunity [holds that] the paradigm
of equal opportunity is a truly objective, neutral, and fair
method to allocate educational, employment, and
political resources to members of society, without
regard to race, class, gender, or ethnicity. The ideal of
equality assumes the possibility of an objective measure
of merit under which individuals' abilities and
performances may be evaluated. Accordingly, through
the creation of a baseline that presupposes the inherent
sameness of all people and disregards systemic
discrimination as a fallacy, any social and economic
inequality that exists is said to be legitimate because it

187

Jost & Hunyady, supra note 162, at 261 tbl.1.

188Id. (belief

that "[t]he

system rewards individual ability and

motivation, so success is an indicator of personal deservingness").
189 Id. (belief that "[mlarket-based procedures and outcomes are not
only efficient but are inherently fair, legitimate and just").
190Id. (belief that "[e]conomic inequality is natural, inevitable, and
legitimate; economic outcomes are fair and deserved").
191Id. (belief that "[s]ome groups are superior to others; group-based
hierarchy is a good thing").
192 See supra Part III.B.
193 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 267-77 (1978).
194 Id. at 276.
195 See id. at 280, n.14 (reframing the injury as being denied the
opportunity to "compete for all . . . places in the class, simply because of his
race").
196 SeeJost & Hunyady, supra note 162, at 261.
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purportedly reflects the natural results of deficient
personal choices.197
In using the rhetoric of equal opportunity, the Court's reframing of the injury is a veiled attempt to preserve existing patterns
of inequality.198 The Court uses ideological language to translate the
injury from one involving a mere denial of admission to one
implicating the fairness of the social system as a whole. The former
injury was clearly conjectural, yet the latter framing of the injury
appeared to the Court to constitute a real and concrete threat to the
status quo. The Court found standing through a process of
rationalization in its effort to ease the guilty pangs of conscience that
comes with viewing inequality.
The Court's decision in Parents Involved99 similarly relied on
system-justifying ideologies to uphold standing by broadly refraiing
the alleged injuries. The plaintiffs in that case sought to undo the
desegregation plans adopted by schools in racially segregated cities.
The alleged injury was clearly speculative and conjectural under
precedent. It merely alluded to the possibility that the plaintiffs'
children may someday try to enroll in the desegregating schools, and
that those students may also be denied admission under the plan.200
However, the Court viewed these harms as threats to the status quo
and its underlying ideologies of individualism, colorblindness, and
meritocracy. The Court was enamored with individual stories of
"white innocence" and equal opportunity during its analysiS201 and

197 Christian B. Sundquist, Equal Opportunity, Individual Libert, and
Meritocracy in Education: Reinforcing Structures of Privilege and Inequality, 9 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 227, 228-29 (2002).
198 Id. at 229. ("I disagree with the conception of equal opportunity
as an objective, neutral, natural, and fair principle that enables social minorities
to progress in society, limited only by their own ability and free choices.

Rather, equal opportunity is an intricate fabrication intended to preserve the
status quo and language of the dominant culture through reliance on popular,
yet mythical, norms of individualism, sameness, and neutrality.").
199 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007).
200 Id. at 718-19. The "complaint sought declaratory and injunctive
relief on behalf of Parents Involved members whose elementary and middle
school children 'may be denied admission to the high schools of their choice
when they apply for those schools in the future.'" Id. at 718 (emphasis added).
The Court still granted standing, finding that "[t]he fact that it is possible that
children of group members will not be denied admission to a school based on
their race ... does not eliminate the injury claimed." Id. at 718-19.
201 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. Professor Thomas
Ross has argued that concepts of white innocence, even if unintentional,
pervade the American court system as exemplified by legal rhetoric affording
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strove to find a way to uphold the "private choices" of white
parents to live in racially segregated neighborhoods. 202 Using
system-justifying ideological tools, the Court refrained the claimed
injury as a response to the systemic threat of desegregadon. 203
C. The First Principles of Standing Law
The law of standing appears to be intelligible only through
the schema of privilege.
The tripartite standing framework
developed by the Court is an attempt to demarcate the often times
nebulous space between ideological discourse and objective legal
thought. The legitimacy of standing law derives in part from a
denial of the political contingency of the representational metaphors
upon which it relies. 204 The interpretation of the injury-in-fact,
causation, and redressability tropes is inevitably value-laden,
normative, and system-justifying. The foundational first principles
of standing doctrine thus are characterized by a belief in the
legitimacy and fairness of the existing distribution of social
resources:
1) perpetuation of the existing structures of racial,
economic, and social privilege in maintenance of
the status quo, and
2) distortion and rationalization of images of
inequality through the use of metaphorical
ideological devices.
Recognition of these foundational principles provides an
unfortunate determinacy to the law of standing that was previously
whites a lack of culpability and simultaneously abstracting black disadvantage
to an impersonal level, thereby denying the full humanness of blacks. Thomas
Ross, The RhetoricalTapesty of Race: White Innocence and Black Abstraction, 32 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1990).
202 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 736 ("Where resegregation is a product
not of state action but of private choices, it does not have constitutional
implications.") (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 495 (1992)).
203 See id. at 719 ("[Olne form of injury under the Equal Protection
Clause is being forced to compete in a race-based system that may prejudice
the plaintiff, an injury that the members of Parents Involved can validly claim

on behalf of their children.") (internal citations omitted).
204 Professor Gary Peller observes that "[1]egal thought distinguishes
from open-ended ideological discourse by implicitly denying the contingency
of the representational metaphors, such as the public/private or fact/value
distinctions, on which its persuasiveness depends. When these background
structures are taken as that 'which goes without saying,' they work as
metaphysical assumptions about the world." Peller, supra note 1, at 1154.
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lacking and which could not be accounted for by the traditional
normative justifications for standing doctrine.
The guiding
principles of standing law are granted normative power through the
invocation of various system-justifying modalities: individualism
and the reification of private rights, equal opportunity and the
victimology of white innocence, colorblind constitutionalism and
post-racialism, and meritocracy and free market ideology. 205
There is an additional limitation on standing law, which is
based on the principle that the process of system justification will
not be activated if it is within the interest of the dominant social
group to redefine the status quo. 206 This limitation on standing
doctrine tracks both the psycho-legal concept of "interest
convergence" and SJT's theory of "inevitable change." The concept
of "interest convergence" was first developed by Professor Derrick
Bell and posits that the interests of the subordinated class in
reducing or eliminating inequality will be accommodated only when
they converge with the interests of the elite class. 207 This theory is
similar to SJT's finding that system justification tendencies are
avoidable if a change in the status quo appears to be inevitable. 208
As Professor Jost notes, "[a]lternadves to the status quo may be
derogated when they are considered improbable, but they may
become much more attractive as their probability of success
increases. "209

A basic formula can describe the interplay between the
concepts. The likelihood of a judge expressing system-justification
tendencies in order to preserve the status quo condition of privilege
(LP) depends on an assessment of the judge's level of cognitive
dissonance (CD) balanced against the persuasive power of the
alternative account for inequality (AA).
Breaking down the
components further,

See generally Jost & Hunyady, supra note 162, at 261.
See infra Part III.
207 See generall DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE
WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM (1993).
208 See Jost et al., GoalPursuit,supra note 166, at 600.
205

206

209

Id
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LP (likelihood of preserving privilege) = CD (level of
cognitive dissonance) [perceived system threat (T) +
dispositional need for structure and order (N)] / AA
(persuasive power of the alternative account) [level of
interest convergence (IC) + perceived inevitability of
system change (PI)], or

rCD [T + N)

AA[Iw

wP
I

The above formulaic expression of the likelihood of a court
expressing system justifying attitudes is not a backdoor attempt to
resurrect a new legal formalism. 210 Rather, a visual account of the
various factors that are relevant to system justification helps to
clarify the steps that can be taken to reduce or eliminate the
propensity of judges to shape their decisions in an effort to protect
the status quo. Advocates could attempt to downplay the court's
perception of system threat (T) in a given case. Advocates could try
to persuade a court of the inevitability of system change (PI),
arguing that it is within the interest of the dominant group to
redefine the status quo (IC).
However, it is unrealistic that
advocates could achieve substantive change by playing within the
rules of a hopelessly flawed legal framework.

V.

BEYOND THE "TRANSCENDENTAL NONSENSE" OF
STANDING

The failings of standing doctrine cannot be resolved by
modifying the existing framework, redefining terminology,211
focusing on legal injury rather than factual injury,212 making a

210

See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV.

1, 13 (1983) (recounting Christopher Columbus Langdell's view of law as a
science).
211 See Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN L. REV. 227, 230
(1990) (arguing that standing law should shift from an individualistic, private
rights model to a public law model that focuses on adjudicating constitutional
questions).
212 Sunstein, supra note 14, at 166 (arguing that the "relevant question

is [not whether there was an " 'injury-in-fact,' but] whether the law-governing
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distinction between private and public rights, 213 instituting a
presumption favoring the plaintiffs claim of injury,214 or relaxing the
requirement of injury-in-fact. 215 The convoluted doctrine that
evolved from the Court's disingenuous interpretation of "case" or
"controversy" must be forsaken completely. Merely modifying the
requirements of standing will do little to guard against privilege and
political decision-making. Instead, the entire language of standing
must be removed from the judicial toolbox.
A number of well-regarded academics have suggested
altering the framework to account for privilege by creating a
presumption in favor of standing. 216 This proposal would eliminate
the existing set of standing rules, requiring only that the plaintiff
demonstrate a "real adversity" with the defendant and a reasonably
"concrete" factual record.217 A court still would be able to deny
standing in certain situations, when "strong reasons are brought to
bear against its exercise." 218 According to its proponents, the
benefits of this approach lie in its potential to restrain ideological
decision-making through a relaxation of the injury-in-fact
requirement. 219
While the privilege-constraining aims of this approach are
certainly laudable, it does not appear that this modified standing test
would do much to eliminate ideological decision-making. The
"presumption" approach does not address the psychological triggers
of system-justifying judicial behavior, nor does it remove the use of
statutes, the Constitution, or federal common law-has conferred on the
plaintiffs a cause of action"); see also Fletcher,supra note 3, at 812.
213 F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injug in Fact, and Private Rights, 93
CORNELL L. REv. 275, 275 (2008) ("[R]equiring a showing of factual injury in
private rights cases is ahistorical and actually undermines the separation of
powers by preventing the courts from guarding rights and by limiting
Congress's powers to create rights.").
214 Nichol, supra note 89, at 338, 339-40 (arguing that "[t]he injury
inquiry should embrace a significant presumption in favor of the plaintiffs
claim of harm").
215 Siegel, supra note 59 (advocating for a reform of standing law by
relaxing standards).
216 Mark V. Tushnet, The Sociolog of Article III: A Response to Professor
Brilmayer, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1698, 1705-07 (1980); Nichol, supra note 89, at
305, 339.
217 Tushnet, supranote 216, at 1706.
218 Nichol, supranote 89, at 339.
219 Id. ("A generous predisposition towards finding injury would also
go far to dismantle the artificial categories of injury that have rendered the
Court's standing jurisprudence one of the most manipulated, result-oriented
arenas of constitutional law.").
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ambiguous standards and language from the standing calculus. How
does one decide which cases satisfy the presumption and which do
not? What guidelines should a court apply in determining whether
to invoke the discretionary exception to reject standing? Under this
approach, it is easy to envision the possibility of ideologically-based
denials of standing on the purported grounds that the plaintiffs
failed to proceed either because they failed to generate a sufficiently
"concrete" factual record or because "strong policy reasons" militate
against standing.220 By exchanging one malleable standard for
another, the proposal merely changes the language used to
rationalize decisions on standing that privilege white victims.
Another notable approach to standing reform argues that
the issue of standing should be linked to the substantive merits of a
case. 221
Relying on observations that the current standing
framework is a mere proxy for the Court's ideological view of the
merits of a case, the "substantive" approach argues that the test for
standing instead should be based entirely on the presence of a
judicially-cognizable legal injury.222 In particular, this approach
advocates that the courts should defer to congressional
determinations of statutory standing. 223 The proposal acknowledges
that a substantive test for standing will not eradicate political
decision-making completely, 224 but that this approach would reduce
the potential for judicial mischief by barring courts from making
normative-based standing decisions. The substantive approach ties
the standing analysis to the presence of substantive constitutional,
statutory, and common-law rights.
This proposal suffers from the familiar failings of normative
interpretation and linguistic ambiguity. By linking standing to the
determination of substantive rights, the proposal merely replaces
220

See Staudt, supra note 89, at 672-73.

Professor Staudt relies on

empirical data to conclude that the presumption approach to reform would
not constrain political decision-making in the standing context.
221 See Fletcher, supra note 3, at 223; Cass R. Sunstein, Informational
Regulation and Information Standing: Atkins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613,
616-17 (1999).
222 Fletcher, supranote 3, at 229 (arguing that the question of whether
a plaintiff has a "legal right to judicial enforcement of an asserted legal duty ...
should be seen as a question of substantive law").
223 Sunstein, supra note 14, at 191 ("whether an injury is cognizable
should depend on what the legislature has said").
224 Cf Sunstein, supra note 221, at 616-17 (arguing that, with respect
to cases involving standing to obtain information, "the question of standing is
for congressional rather than judicial resolution . . . . If Congress creates a legal
right to information and gives people the authority to vindicate that right in
court, the standing question is essentially resolved.").
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one kind of indeterminacy with another. The interpretation of
constitutional and statutory substantive rights has long been rife
with inconsistency and normativity.
The tremendous judicial
discretion involved in the analysis of constitutional and statutory
language gives rise to ideological game-playing and system
rationalization.
The interpretation of language deemed to be
"ambiguous" is often dependent on the application of contested and
conflicting canons of construction, which themselves often
represent a particular ideological position. Even when the law is not
ambiguous, courts often find reason to go beyond the plain meaning
of language in order to advance a particular political agenda. 225 As
Professor Staudt has noted, "[d]eferring to substantive law .

.

. does

not foreclose judicial discretion." 226
By relying on a false
substantive-procedural distinction, the substantive approach simply
does not lead us out of the mire of incoherence.
If the principal reform proposals are lacking, then how
should we change the law to account for its tendency to promote
privilege normatives? How can we modify the law to reduce or
eliminate the system-justifying tendencies of judges? The answer
lies in not merely changing the standing inquiry, but in eliminating it
altogether. Standing doctrine is mandated neither by the text nor
the history of Article III. It consists of a subjective set of criteria
that can be manipulated by perceptions of system threat to
rationalize inequality and deny access to justice to those at the
"bottom of the well." 227 The law of standing cannot be modified to
eliminate privilege, as the language of access necessarily is imbued
with political meaning. The words and phrases used to convey the
notion of standing-whether in its original or reformed positionare infinitely malleable and veil the operation of privilege. The
privileging aspects of standing are rarely recognized or "seen" by the
courts, as privilege itself is shaped by societal norms deemed neutral
and objective by the dominant group. The law of standing
nonetheless serves to normalize privilege and rationalize existing
social inequality. 228
Thus, the concept of standing must be
discarded in its entirety.

225

For instance, consider the "cases" and "controversies" language

of Article III. See U.S. CONST. art. III. The language can be given a clear and

unambiguous interpretation that does not give rise to a constitutional
requirement of standing.
226 Staudt, supranote 89, at 680.
227 BELL, supranote 207.
228 Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Making Systems of
Pvilege Visible, in PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE

UNDERMINES AMERiCA 7-24 (Stephanie Wildman et al. eds., 1996) (arguing
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CONCLUSION

Professor Derrick Bell once implored that we should look
to "the bottom of the well" in judging law: If a law does not benefit
the most disadvantaged of society, it should be rejected. 229
Accordingly, the law of standing should be rejected. Standing
requirements only serve to rationalize existing inequality while
masking the reproduction of privilege. The evaluation of
redressable legal injuries is necessarily a value-laden and subjective
process, which is influenced by the social position, past experiences,
and worldview of individual judges.
The Court has demonstrated, in the affirmative action and
desegregation contexts, a willingness to wield the submissive sword
of standing to cut down threats to the status quo and privilege. As
the empirical findings of System Justification Theory demonstrate,
the Court often invokes the law of standing to rationalize and
normalize system-justifying responses to perceived system threats.
The Court denies standing routinely in cases advancing the rights of
non-white plaintiffs, as the Court myopically sees the injuries
claimed as too speculative and disconnected from the experiences of
individual justices to qualify for judicial review under Article 111.230
Conversely, the Court strains to locate "injuries" in cases involving
the racialized claims of white plaintiffs, even when such claims
would seem to be insufficient for Article III review under prior case
law. 231 Therefore, the law of standing, for these and other reasons,
is widely acknowledged as being hopelessly incoherent. The
infamous indeterminacy of standing law, however, can be provided
some coherence once it is acknowledged that judicial decisionmaking is heavily influenced by perceived threats to the racial status
quo. The Court's standing jurisprudence in cases involving racial
injuries is therefore determinable and predictable not by precedent
or the language of Article III, but by the nature and extent of the
perceived system threat. To put it bluntly, the Court is as likely to
minimize the injuries of plaintiffs seeking to challenge racial
inequality, as it is to generously construe the injuries of plaintiffs
seeking to preserve existing structures of racial hegemony (e.g.,
segregation, discrimination, profiling).

that privilege appears as part of the normal fabric of daily life and becomes a
world to which those without privilege must adjust.).
229 See generally BELL, supra note 207.
230 See supra Part III.A.
231 See supra Part III.B.
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Reform proposals focused on massaging the language of
standing requirements, while nonetheless retaining "standing" as a
limit to justiciability, are not sufficient to mediate the systemjustifying preferences of the courts. The language of standing
doctrine is simply too malleable and value-laden to be co-opted for
the inapposite purpose of defeating privilege. Rather, standing
doctrine as a whole must be eliminated as a barrier to social justice
and the ability of the non-privileged to assert substantive rights.
There is simply no constitutional justification for retaining the
embattled requirement of standing as a limit on federal court access.
Moreover, the sky will not fall once standing limitations are
eviscerated, counter to the expected claims of defenders of the
existing legal framework.
Our federal court system operated
smoothly for nearly two hundred years before our understanding of
"cases" and "controversies" became clouded with unworkable tort
concepts like "injury-in-fact," "causation," and "redressability." 232
While the federal judiciary may find themselves short an arrow in
their quiver of justiciability, there are still many procedural tools
remaining to dispose of meritless and fantastical claims. 233
Additionally, courts still will be free to resort to a multitude of
prudential, sub-constitutional mechanisms to promote efficient
judicial review. 234 The practical result of eliminating standing from
the justiciability calculus, thus, would not be to open the
"floodgates" inappropriately to federal judicial review, but rather to
expand federal court access for non-white litigants seeking judicial
protection of important constitutional and statutory rights. As
Justice Brennan implored in his dissent in McClesky v. Kemp, we must
not continue to retain a flawed framework of constitutional
adjudication out of a "fear of too much justice." 235

232

See supraPart II.

233

For instance, federal courts have the power to entertain motions

for dismissal and summary judgment. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6) & 56.
234 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (noting several
prudential, sub-constitutional standing limitations, including the zone of
interests test, the generalized grievances limitation, and restrictions on thirdparty standing).
235 481 U.S. 279, 339 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

